Webinars and wonders: A running sheet of interesting events during s2, 2021

Photo by Pkdowling313 [CC BY SA 4.0] 

 

I am listing the webinars I have attended this semester so I can keep track of those I wish to return to or to write up later. I will improve this page over the rest of the semester and add links where available.

24th August 2021, 3pm: NATSEM online workshop on electric vehicle policy.

26th August 2021, 11am: ANU SPIR, Revisiting the Baconian Method, Professor John Ure.

31st August 2021, 5pm: ANZSOG@ANU Online Book Launch. Politics, Policy and Public Administration in Theory and in Practice: Essays in honour of Professor John Wanna.

31st August 2021, 5pm: Sydney Institute, Twenty Years after 9/11 – The Hon John Howard AC.

3rd September 2021, 10am: CEDA Roundtable: Rapid antigen testing for Covid-19

3rd September 2021, 3pm: CEDA  Duty of care: meeting the aged care workforce challenge

6th September 2021, 12pm: CEDA Building trust in technology

13th September 2021, 12pm: CEDA Pandemic to endemic - beyond the jab. Speakers: Laureate Professor Peter Doherty AC, Melinda Cilento, Chief Executive, CEDA, Professor Raina MacIntyre, Head, Biosecurity Research Program, Kirby Institute, UNSW.

13th September 2021, 5pm: Sydney Institute Christianity and Australian Jurists – Chris Merritt, Justice Geoff Lindsay, Professor Wayne Hudson & Anne Henderson.

20th-22nd September 2021: Australian Political Studies Conference, Macquarie University.

23rd September 2021, 3.10pm: University of Canberra Human Research Ethics Committee, Ethical by Design: The Principles of the National Statement, Ian Pieper, Anesh Nair, Matt Muskat.

23rd September 2021, 5pm: Lowy Institute Australia's submarines: The world reacts.

27th September 2021, 6pm: United States Study Centre NATO Expert Talk Series: NATO's arms-control agenda.

29th September 2021, 12.30pm: Centre for Independent Studies, On Liberty EP70 | Peter Jennings | Did Australia buy the right boat? AUKUS, AUSMIN, and the "forever" alliance.

29th September 2021, 5pm: Lowy Institute Aiding the Pacific’s economic recovery.

30th September 2021, 10am: Sydney Institute, China, the United States and All That – Thomas Friedman.

30th September 2021, 6pm: Centre for Independent Studies Is Populism A Threat To Liberal Democracy? Professor Joe Forgas

5th October 2021, 3.30pm: CEDA Improving Australia's digital competitiveness

6th October 2021, 11am: Sydney Institute India and Pakistan after the Return of the Taliban – Sadanand Dhume.

6th October 2021, 12pm: The Australian Plus event, What Really Happened in Wuhan. Sharri Markson.

7th October 2021, 11am: United States Study Centre, The future of US politics: A conversation with The Brookings Institution's Sarah Binder and Thomas Mann.

12th October 2021, 6pm: CILTA, Intelligent Docks - Reducing congestion, demurrage, overtime and emissions. Adam Welch, Practice Manager, Assurance at Bestrane. https://ciltinternational.org/events/intelligent-docks-reducing-congestion-demurrage-overtime-and-emissions/.

13th October 2021, 9am: Centre for Independent Studies, The New Cold War. Professor John Mearsheimer.

14th October 2021, 4pm: Lowy Institute, In Conversation with Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro L. Locsin Jr.

18th October 2021, 12pm: Lowy Institute, 2021 Lowy Institute Media Lecture. Yalda Hakim.

21st October 2021, recorded: Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Papua New Guinea and the Belt and Road Initiative: the road to ruins or riches, Sarah O'Dowd.

26th October 2021, 5pm: The Sydney Institute, Dark Emu, Bruce Pascoe and the Hunter/Gatherer Controversy – Geoffrey Blainey & Warren Mundine.

11th November 2021, 6pm: Lowy Institute, 2021 Lowy Lecture — Jake Sullivan, US National Security Adviser.

11th-12th November 2021, 10am to 4pm: ACSPRI, Questionnaire Design Online. Dr Gordon Emmerson.

NSW ICAC Model: 'Shame culture' institution not suited to Australian democracy

Poor timing of the announcement into the investigation of Gladys Berejiklian aside, the NSW ICAC model represents a 'shame culture' institution that is not suited to Australian democracy.

The announcement by the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of an investigation into the NSW Premier's alleged "breach of public trust" the week before lockdown ends was inherently political, despite it being within the institution’s powers.

The many people who voted for the NSW Government can be justifiably upset by the timing and the fact that unelected bodies like ICAC can influence political leadership in times of crisis. What system of redress do voters have toward this unelected body? 

Citizens do not vote for ICAC, but ICAC has created a situation that has toppled the leader of the party the majority of voters in NSW wanted to be in government. 

In the context of the current crisis, NSW citizens may be justifiably confused by the over-reach of power given to ICAC. Adam Smith's ‘impartial and well-informed spectator’ would be right to question whether ICAC’s actions were politically motivated.

In addition to preventing corruption, the model for ICAC in NSW has created a situation where an unelected body can ruin a state premier's reputation by doing little more than raising a suspicion. Simply put, the model for the NSW ICAC, originally designed to root out endemic corruption in 1980s NSW, has more recently focused on a process of ‘naming and shaming’.

To be sure, ICAC has had its successes in fighting corruption, but since its founding in 1988, three NSW premiers have now been named and shamed. The first two premiers lost their positions but were subsequently found not to have broken the law.

And a third premier has been shamed initially through collateral damage from a public hearing into another person, and subsequently through a public announcement of an investigation. This resulted in her resignation.

ICAC's powers need to be reviewed. Its current model can disrupt political leadership at the whim of an announcement. Three unelected bureaucrats, one full-time and two part-time commissioners, effectively hold the power of veto over state premiers in NSW.

A similar anti-corruption body has been debated at the federal level. But rather than the NSW model, the proposed federal model would not have public hearings. Some say that this is wrong - if it is good enough for others then it is good enough for the political elite.

But imagine if a prime minister was wrongly named and shamed and the federal government imploded like the NSW government is imploding this week? There is a clear incentive for enemies of the Australian state to use this system to destabilise our national government. Arguably, a federal anti-corruption body in the same mould as NSW represents a national security risk.

The NSW ICAC requires reform. Unelected bodies that have such power over our liberal democratic system are a destabilising force. That a third NSW premier has fallen from the 'shame culture' response created by ICAC suggests the efficacy of ICAC has been compromised by this capability.

But even if ICAC finds that the NSW Premier acted unethically (as opposed to illegally), is the political instability worth the finding? Voters are best able to decide who should lead them. Finding political solutions to political problems is a basic principle of liberal democracies.

The key issue is prosecuting something versus publicly naming and shaming. ‘Naming and shaming’ creates collateral damage that cannot be undone. Public hearings that destabilise our political system do not make politicians more accountable. They distract our political leaders from doing their jobs, especially in times of crisis. 

The concept of the rule of law provides for the rights of individuals and the inherent principle of innocence until proven guilty. Nevertheless, in cases such as those relating to national security, the burden of proof can be reversed. But the point is that the 'accused' engages with the legal process.

NSW ICAC investigations, when announced, do not facilitate the concepts of 'innocent until proven guilty' or rely on the reversal of the burden of proof. ICAC announcements are a form of naming and shaming that reinforces the perception of guilt.

The NSW ICAC model represents a 'shame culture' institution that is not suited to Australian democracy. Any federal anti-corruption body would benefit from closer adherence to the accepted norms of the rule of law and avoid the naming and shaming model adopted in NSW.

Has China compromised its long-term strategic discipline?

The image tweeted by Chinese Government spokesman Zhao Lijian in 2020.

I was rather surprised when China's spokesman Zhao Lijian tweeted the image above. My reading of Mao Tse-Tung seemed pretty straightforward in terms of a long-term strategy for China. Even during the changes brought about by Deng Xiaoping in the 1990s that led to having a foot in both camps (socialist/capitalist), it was not an undoing of Mao's strategy.

For example, Mao warned that by 2001 China would be a great socialist industrial country, but:

...we must be modest - not only now, but forty-five years hence as well. We should always be modest. In our international relations, we Chinese people should get rid of great-power chauvinism resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely. "In Commemoration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen" (November 1956). 

It was certainly the case that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping seemingly adapted Mao's strategy to changing circumstances, in that:

It is perfectly true that we should learn from the good experience of all countries, socialist or capitalist, about this there is no argument. 

Further, and although not blindly trusting the West, there was no strategic intention by Mao to start a war:

As for the imperialist countries, we should unite with their people and strive to coexist peacefully with those countries, do business with them and prevent a possible war, but under no circumstances should we harbour any unrealistic notions about them.

So what has brought about the change in China's strategy? Today, I was fortunate enough to be able to pose this question to New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman, at a Sydney Institute event:

 

It was interesting that Friedman couldn't work it out either. It just doesn't make any sense. I would argue that China has messed up its foreign and strategic policy, perhaps echoing Mao's warnings against great-power chauvinism. The discipline that China sustained for the last eight decades is impressive, yet it has been so readily undone in just a few short years. 

For me, at least, it justifies Australia's strategic policy response, and the world has changed yet again. What an interesting period of history to have witnessed.